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Abstract
In his stimulating article on the reasons for two puzzling observations about the be-
haviour of interest rates, exchange rates and the rate of inflation, Charles Engel (2016)
puts forward an explanation that rests on the concept of a non-pecuniary liquidity re-
turn on assets. Albeit intriguing the analysis struggles to account for a number of
facts which are familiar to participants of the foreign exchange and bond markets.
Reconciling these facts in conjunction with a careful dissection of the “puzzle” to be-
gin with, shows that the forward premium puzzle just does not exist, at least not in
its canonical form.
JEL classification: F31, F47, C53
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. . . a scientist must also be absolutely like a child. If
he sees a thing, he must say he sees it, whether it was
what he thought he was going to see or not. See first,
think later, then test. But always see first. Otherwise
you will only see what you were expecting.
Wonko the Sane
1 Introduction
The forward premium puzzle intrigues economists because no matter how hard one tries
the data does not live up to a seemingly straightforward, logical theory. Ever since its
introduction to the literature (e.g. Meese and Rogoff, 1983; Fama, 1984) economists have
tirelessly attempted to crack it. The fascinating and stimulating article by Engel in the
February 2016 volume of the American Economic Review is another such endeavour.
This note argues that the uncovered interest parity “puzzle” is not a puzzle to begin
with, or rather, that the puzzling features are owed to the specific epistemological approach
economists have chosen. The argument is twofold. First, the canonical form of puzzle fails
to properly account for certain market features although they leave recognisable traces in
the standard data sets. Second, and most importantly, the puzzle itself must be considered
a methodological construct which is at odds with the very scientific principles that are
used in its investigations.
The arguments are divided into two main parts. Part one deals with the phenomeno-
logical aspect of the puzzle and the second with the underlying structure.
The phenomenological part recalls some stylised facts of the markets under consider-
ation. These markets are the foreign exchange markets and the market for short-term
bonds. The according observations will be turned into testable hypotheses shedding light
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on sometimes disregarded data properties. Checking these properties lends support to
rejecting the puzzle. Part two of the argument consecutively adds structural arguments to
this note’s main claim that the forward premium puzzle is best considered an economists’
fiction rather than a real world phenomenon. Finally, conclusions for the future of eco-
nomic analysis will be drawn.
2 The puzzle that isn’t
The starting point for the forward premium puzzle is the well-known no-arbitrage-condition
due to the uncovered interest parity (henceforth UIP) condition which can be cast as fol-
lows
i∗ − it = st − st+1
where i signifies the interest rate on one-period bonds and st the log of the price of the
foreign currency in period t expressed in home currency units (the US dollar). An asterisk
indicates foreign prices.
The above relationship states that the difference in interest that could be earned by
either investing in foreign or domestic bonds must match the change in the log-exchange
rate in order to exclude arbitrage opportunities.
The no-arbitrage condition thus links two otherwise independent markets. It seems so
logical and convincing in the light of the efficient market hypothesis that usually only little
effort is spent on explaining, let alone substantiating it before turning to the empirical
part. However, in order for arbitrage to actually work, some tacit assumptions must hold.
For example, it must be maintained that both markets are similar in actual or potential
size, or ease of access. Therefore, we will first look at the actual properties of the markets
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for gauging the extent to which they are indeed related as the uncovered interest parity
condition suggests.
2.1 The phenomenological approach to puzzle resolution
2.1.1 Stylised facts
The UIP links two different markets. The no-arbitrage conditions states that they both
must influence each other for arbitrage to be ruled out.
The custom in the literature has it that the short term bond market is captured by the
price for money market bonds and the exchange rates are spot rate markets commonly
tracked by central banks or other data providers. In the case of Engel’s (2016) analysis
the market for one-month money market bonds with prices represented by the mid-point
of offer and bid rates of 1-month annual Euro rates are considered. The spot exchange
rates in Engel (2016, online appendix) are surveyed transaction prices. A first stylised fact
therefore is that bond market transaction prices are usually not observed but spot foreign
exchange (and foreign exchange swap) transaction prices are.
Second, money market bonds are traded either in the form of swaps or by outright
bond purchases. In all cases there is an underlying credit contract between – usually
– a commercial bank and some other market participant or another commercial bank.
Whenever a non-bank is involved at least, the counterparty, the commercial bank will also
consider the credibility of the debtor because the contract extends over a non-zero time
span. The implication of this observation is that credit contracts are complicated and bear
some risk whereas spot foreign exchange contracts do not. It should be expected that this
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complication puts a brake on the volume of traded contracts.1 In brief, short-term bond
market transactions are more complicated than spot foreign exchange markets which is
the second stylised fact.
Third, partly owed to the above, partly due to potentially other reasons, markets for
money markets bonds are small if not tiny in comparison to spot foreign exchange markets.
In fact, it is very difficult to actually measure the size of the market because there are
various definitions available. However, irrespective of the definition, spot foreign exchange
markets see a turnover that is several multiples that of short-term bond markets (see table
1 below).
The table 1 below presents some estimates of the respective sizes based on recent 2013
BIS and Swiss National Bank data. By one such estimate the daily turnover of Swiss
Francs against the US dollar and the Euro combined (all foreign exchange instruments)
amounted to USD bill 286 in 2013 while the total of money market instruments by Swiss
banks (including local subsidiaries of foreign banks, liabilities plus assets) at the end of 2013
was about USD bill 100.2 In other, words, it would have taken Swiss banks to turn over all
their stock of money market liabilities more than twice a day only to reach the volume of
the daily CHF/USD and CHF/EUR exchange market. The ratio was smaller in previous
years which underlines the liquidity problems money market experienced following the
financial crisis. The basic observation of a large gap in market sizes holds nonetheless.
Due to reasons that will be detailed in the second part, being small implies that the
expected variance of the price for short-term bonds is small compared to the variance of
exchange rates. This expectation is not trivial as one could think that very active markets
1 Ever since the financial crises, ie after the end of Engel’s (2016) sample, credit swaps also reflect
default risks of commercial banks which is a fairly new phenomenon.
2 Supposing a unit exchange rate for simplicity (SNB, 2015)
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Table 1: Market sizes
Market / instrument volume bill USD source / remark
Foreign exchange by instrument1 2013
outright forward 680 / day BIS (2013, table 1)
spot 2,046 / day BIS (2013, table 1)
fx swaps 2,228 / day BIS (2013, table 1)
currency swaps 54 / day BIS (2013, table 1)
options and other2 337 / day BIS (2013, table 1)
TOTAL 5,345 / day BIS (2013, table 1)
Foreign exchange turnover by currency pairs1 2013
USD / EUR 1,289 / day BIS (2013, table 3)
USD / JPY 978 / day BIS (2013, table 3)
USD / GBP 472 / day BIS (2013, table 3)
USD / CAD 200 / day BIS (2013, table 3)
USD / CHF 184 / day BIS (2013, table 3)
USD interest rate swaps 6–24 months to maturity3 turnover 2016
all products 1,205 / week CFTC (2015)
Money market instruments all Swiss banks4 2013
assets 20 by e.o.y SNB (2015, table 7)
liabilities 78 by e.o.y SNB (2015, table 18)
TOTAL 98 by e.o.y
1Adjusted for cross-border and inter-dealer double counting.
2Other includes leveraged products which could not be disentan-
gled into individual plain vanilla products. 3Week 28 March -
1 April 2016, includes the following products: fixed float, FRA,
Cap/Floor, Debt Option, Exotic, Fixed-Fixed, Inflation, OIS,
Swaption, and Basis. Further details: http://www.cftc.gov/
MarketReports/SwapsReports/L1INtRatesTransDolVol. 4Stock
at end of year.
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lead to more efficient price discoveries and hence lower volatility. As a matter of fact,
however, foreign exchange markets are much more volatile. For example, the Engel (2016)
data exhibits a variance in the change of the log exchange rate (the right hand side of the
UIP condition) that is one hundred to almost three hundred multiples of the variance of
the change in the interest rate spread while the correlation is a meagre 3.3 to 15 percent
(see table 2).3 This considerable gap in variances is the fourth stylised fact (see also chart
3 of Wang, 2008).
Empirically, we thus have to deal with [1] easily observable foreign exchange market
prices, [2] very low obstacles to trade, [3] a very large size and [4] high volatility on foreign
exchange markets. The short-term bond market by contrast is characterised by not easily
observable prices, some obstacles to market access, smaller size and much lower volatility.
These stylised facts affect the empirical analysis in at least two distinct ways. First,
facts [2] and [3] call into question the tacit assumption of equally easy access to the market
and the actual possibility to conduct arbitrage. Anyone who would like to invest in short-
term bonds instead of foreign exchange would first have to find a suitable counterparty and
must undergo a credibility assessment (fact [2]).4 After overcoming these problems, the
investor might face too low a volume of bonds available for matching his or her intended
investment (fact [3]).
Second, due to the difficulties of observing the precise transaction prices on the money
market (fact [1]) and the enormous differences in variance (fact [4]), regression analysis
must be expected to deliver only imprecise estimates (Wang and Jones, 2003).
Put together, the stylised facts imply that the data of Engel (2016) will hardly be
3 To be exact, this comparison is based on the actual regression equation (1) below. The following
claims are not affected by this particular measurement.
4 Having to find a perfectly suitable short-term bond does not simplify matters.
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Table 2: FAMA regressands properties: Variances and correlation
ρt+1 = ζs + βs (i
∗
t − it) + us,t+1
country V ar(ρt+1) V ar(i
∗
t − it) factor corr. (%)
CAN 3.783 0.017 229 3.74
FRA 10.248 0.065 158 7.85
GER 10.596 0.050 211 10.45
ITA 9.821 0.098 100 3.31
JAP 11.557 0.040 286 14.95
UK 9.558 0.033 290 10.50
G6 6.607 0.028 238 6.84
“factor” lists the number with which V ar(i∗t − it) has to be
multiplied to match V ar(ρt+1) where V ar() is short for the
variance operator. “corr. (%)” reports the correlation between
V ar(i∗t − it) and V ar(ρt+1) in percent. Sources: Engel (2016,
online appendix), own calculations.
informative about the presence of the puzzle as claimed on basis of the Fama regressions.
Indeed, a careful analysis of the data shows exactly that.
2.1.2 Fama regressions reconsidered
The no-arbitrage condition implied by UIP can be re-written as a regression problem.
Engel (2016) uses the excessive return (ρt) specification (1) below
ρt+1 = ζs + βs (i
∗
t − it) + us,t+1, with(1)
ρt+1 ≡ i∗t + st+1 − st − it
and where us,t+1 represents an error term.
Under UIP we ought to expect ζs and βs to be zero. In contrast to that, Wang and
Jones (2003) argue that one should not hold any particular belief about the estimate of
βs because it will vary wildly owed to the huge gap in the variances of the right hand side
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and left hand side of equation (1). Finally, the forward premium puzzle arises whenever
βs is significantly larger than zero.
Engel (2016, pp. 444-5) claims to have found evidence for this puzzle to be present
in the data for four out of six currency pairs over the sample June 1979 through October
2009 at the 10 percent level of significance. In view of this evidence he then concludes
that the significant deviations from UIP deserve a thorough explanation.
The following robustness check challenges the finding of sufficient evidence for the
forward premium puzzle to prevail. To that aim, the Fama regressions are re-run but
with varying sample definitions. Bearing in mind that a puzzle should be found in most
circumstances, that is independent of time and space to qualify for a dominant regularity,
if not a law that demands a general explanation or resolution, a robustness check in this
manner is very desirable. Furthermore, Engel’s (2016) sample excludes the post-crisis
years which implicitly suggests that the puzzle probably has not survived the most recent
market developments.
We apply two recursive estimation procedures plus a rolling window approach. In all
three cases a maximum of five years of data is shed. In the forward recursion we fix the
start point of the sample and delete one observation after the other starting with the
latest data point. The backward recursion sees the end point fixed and at each step of the
recursive estimation a data point at the beginning of the sample is omitted. Finally, the
rolling window starts with five years of data deleted from the start of the sample. With
each additional estimation, the first sample observation is shifted backwards while deleting
one observation at the beginning. We thus keep the number of observations constant in
all rolling windows regression while the sample sizes range between the full sample size
and the full size less 60 in the recursions.
9
The figure displays estimated lower bounds for the 90-percent confidence intervals for β2 in
the regression ρt+1 = ζs + βs (i
∗
t − it) + us,t+1. The various points correspond to different
sample definitions. Any crossing of the zero line is evidence for non-robustness of the
coefficient estimates.
Figure 1: Recursive Fama estimations
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The results of the recursive estimations are summarized in table 3 and in figure 1
below. Starting with the figure, the top panel which displays the lower bounds of the
90-percent confidence intervals for βs obtained with a fixed starting point it seems as if
the claim of a generally prevailing puzzle indeed holds true. This can be inferred from the
fact that throughout all recursions the lower bounds of the βs coefficients for all countries
but one remain either above (Japan, Germany, Canada, United Kingdom) or below (Italy)
the zero watershed. The case of France is an exception because it exhibits a brief spell of
above zero indicating that the puzzle temporarily prevailed there too. The only slightly
irritating feature seems to be the downward trend of the lower bounds. All in all, only
little evidence (France) arises against the robustness of Engel’s (2016) Fama regressions.
If we move to the centre panel, however, the story changes dramatically. This panel
reports the result of the rolling window which implies that the left-most (right-most)
data points match the right most (left-most) of its upper (bottom) neighbour. Depending
on the specific sample definition, either three countries (France, Canada, Japan) or four
countries (United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Canada) meet the puzzle criteria. What’s
worse, three countries swap their positions between being affected by the puzzle and being
not subject to it (France, Germany, United Kingdom). The switch of Germany and UK is
the more significant for the argument as Germany represents the most important foreign
exchange market by Engel’s (2016) weights.5 Finally, two countries’ lower bounds cross
the zero line multiple times with Germany three times and France even on no less than
ten occasions.
Given the relative stability seen in the upper panel which relates to the fixed start point
recursion and the volatile results for the rolling window, one might expect that the most
5 Engel (2016) assigns Germany and UK a combined weight of 43 percent, with 29 percent for
Germany alone.
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Table 3: Recursive FAMA regressions: Puzzle on and off by sample definition
ρt+1 = ζs + βs (i
∗
t − it) + us,t+1
90% lower bound of βˆs by sample
1979:6 1984:6
country 2004:10 2009:10
CAN 1.929 0.666
FRA -0.056 0.137
GER 0.743 -0.413
ITA -0.663 -1.425
JAP 2.511 1.906
UK 1.703 -0.392
G6 1.004 0.096
Evidence summary
Head count of forward premium puzzle evidence
supporting 4 3
contradicting 2 3
Weighted evidence1
supporting 0.72 0.44
contradicting 0.28 0.56
The head count lists the number of countries for which
the specific sample lends support to the forward pre-
mium puzzle. The weighted evidence combines the
countries and their respective weights as defined in
Engel (2016, online appendix 1.4.1). Own calculations
based on Engel’s (2016) R code (Engel, 2016, online
appendix).
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influential section of the sample must be located in the distant past. The bottom panel
supports this conjecture. It shows the recursive estimations with the sample end fixed. The
left-most observations consequently resemble the results as of Engel (2016, table 1) while
the right-most data points correspond to the sample 1984:6 through 2009:10. This shorter
sample omits the early Volcker years, for example. Based on this shorter sample, again
three countries switch sides (two from puzzle to non-puzzle and France in the opposite
direction) leading to a three-three draw by head count. However, the two heavy-weights
Germany and United Kingdom do not lend support to the presence of a puzzle neither
does a weighted count (see table 1).
Finally, considering the more standard level of significance of 5 percent instead of 10
percent further raises the doubts because the conclusion about the presence of the puzzle
even more strongly depends on the specific definition of the sample. Canada and Japan
are the only two countries for which the presence of the puzzle can be confirmed robustly.
Italy, by contrast, is the country for which no evidence can be found and the G6’s finding
are not robust when looking at the 5 percent significance level.6
To sum up the robustness check, it must be contended that there is no conclusive
evidence about the presence of the forward premium puzzle. The findings of Engel (2016,
p.444) are most probably driven by the most distant parts of the sample. Looking at
slightly more recent evidence the only admissible conclusions appears to be that in some
cases (countries) the puzzle might have been present for some periods, while not so for
other countries and not in other periods. The fact that in many cases the lower bounds
cross the zero line multiple times also safeguards against possible sample size effects. When
6 Engel (2016) focusses on the G6 (weighted) average. Focussing on that aggregate might be tech-
nically convenient, but from the viewpoint of actual arbitrage it certainly is the most problematic
example.
13
shedding observations one can expect that confidence bands grow wider. The recursions
do show, however, that there is no monotonous trend in the evolution of the confidence
bounds.7
For just two countries robust evidence in favour and for one country against the puzzle
exists. The former group does not include the most important country by weight but
Canada and Japan which are clearly distinct from the rest of the countries by extreme
proximity (Canada) and a very particular economic and monetary situation (Japan). To
put it differently, it is impossible to accept the notion of the forward premium puzzle to be
anything close to a general economic law. The question hence arises what investor would
have dared to bet on “excessive” returns based on the presented evidence. The doubts
are the more significant as the most relevant observations in support for the arbitrage
opportunities are from the late 1970ies, early 1980ies but not from data close to the time
of analysis which is from 2009.
An extended recursive analysis that also cover the central empirical findings is pre-
sented in the appendix (see pp. 21f). It shows that virtually all relevant empirical findings
can easily be reversed with an according re-definition of the sample.
Therefore, the robustness check confirms the earlier statement about the implications
of the stylised facts for the possibility of obtaining conclusive evidence about the forward
premium puzzle. As it turns out, it is impossible to draw definite conclusions. In other
words, there might be a puzzle or there might not be, we just cannot tell.
7 The additional recursions presented in the appendix convey the same message.
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2.2 The structural approach to puzzle resolution
2.2.1 The fiction of a forward premium puzzle
Given the shaky foundations on which the empirical proof of the forward premium puzzle
rests, there appears no urgent need to actually elaborate any further on the reasons for the
“puzzle” as its very existence must be doubted in the first place.8 In the following and in
line with the literature, this note maintains that it is impossible to empirically decide about
the existence of a puzzle with sufficient certainty and presents some structural reasoning
for why this might be the case.
The explanation rests on two pillars. The first concerns the actual generation of market
prices and the second the discussion about the laws which are supposed to govern these
prices.
As an illustration of these two pillars consider Jorda` and Taylor (2012) who devise a
profitable arbitrage strategy based on carry trades. To that aim, Jorda` and Taylor take a
stance on what determines foreign exchange rates, among other things. Their stance must
be novel as compared to previous stances because their work would not have been fit for
publication (or their strategy would have been taken advantage of which would ultimately
render it useless due to copying). Suppose now that they would actually implement their
ideas. With each market transaction based on their strategy a new price observation will
arise. This particular observation will hence be ruled by their novel idea (and by another
strategy that devises the same price). Hence, the according price impulse follows the rules
of Jorda` and Taylor’s (2012) model.
The literature on exchange rates is vast, however. Add to this that many strategies
8 Any such research could, however, shed light on the special cases of Canada and Japan.
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never see the light of the day as they are well-kept secrets of professional traders. Only a
very small portion of these ideas will be similar to one another because they could otherwise
not be used by traders9 (nor be accepted for publication for that matter). Therefore, the
market is populated by agents who all hold more or less slightly but genuinely differing
views about what prices to trade on. For example, a statement by a government official,
a terrorist act and so on will be interpreted by traders but each trader would give it a
slightly different interpretation with only the initial direction of change to be agreed on
in the best of cases.
Coming back to the data generation we must content that every actual observation
is driven by the views of ultimately idosynchratic agents quite like in that instant when
Jorda` and Taylor enter the market. The market price can thus be compared to a ball
that receives a kick and each kick is different from the previous one making its movement
unpredictable. On top of this, the more hits the ball takes the more wildly will it move
around.10
Acting along the lines of ones’ model thus reveals the formative nature of foreign
exchange (and many asset) prices. This feature sets those markets apart from problems
in science where the researchers’ ideas do not have an impact on the event under study
such as the orbit of planets.
According to stylised fact [3] foreign exchange markets are huge. To the extend that
size also approximates trader heterogeneity, stylised fact [4] which emphasizes the large
volatility of foreign exchange markets, is a direct consequence of [3]. Therefore, [3] and [4]
are nothing but two sides of the same coin.
9 By the law of efficient markets any publicly known profitable trading strategy must vanish.
10 Note the similarity and difference to the random walk view. Random walk shocks are also unpre-
dictable but assumed to follow a statistical law which does not apply here.
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2.2.2 The epistemology of the forward premium puzzle
In order to fully comprehend the nature of the forward premium puzzle another pillar
enters the argument. This pillar concerns the pattern of economists’ discussion which is
best characterised by the search for a unifying theory for, for example, the determination
of asset prices. This intention can be justified by the analogy to science where, for instance,
all the details of the laws that govern the orbit of the earth have been discovered with the
same positivist approach: first assume the existence of a universal law and then scrutinize
data, reject faulty laws, propose a new law and so on until the true law is established
beyond doubt.11 In the context of social sciences and under the assumption of a universal
law, Muth (1961) has demonstrated that rational reasoning of agents will eventually lead
to its discovery. Needless to say, econometric analysis also ultimately rests on this chain
of argument.
The first pillar of the structural explanation of the puzzle has established, however,
that it is close to impossible that a universal law actually drives markets and generates
observable data. Therefore, the custom of economic analysis is responsible for finding the
forward premium “puzzle” which otherwise does not exist. Many puzzles, in other words,
only exist on the drawing boards of a certain, albeit dominant, approach to economic
analysis and it is highly questionable that they have any bearing for the real economy.
It probably has, however, considerable bearing for economics. This is because as a
consequence of the above the forward premium puzzle consists of two inseparable com-
ponents. They are the existence of an universal law on the one hand and the prevalence
of rational behaviour on the other. If either of both was absent then the puzzle would
11 Arguably, many scientist would certainly object to this description as they take pride in proving the-
ories in a strictly mathematical, axiomatic way. However, experimenting and predictions essentially
are positivist approaches.
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falter. Unfortunately, any empirical test that shows a contradiction between theory and
data such as Fama regressions overwhelmingly do12 will offer no hint as to which of the
two building blocks is wrong.
Though it is beyond the scope of this note, a brief look at economists’ handling of
the forward premium puzzle is warranted. In practice, economists have mainly tried to
reconcile the forward premium puzzle by either of the following: Amending the underlying
theory, establishing or justifying irrational behaviour, using superior data, allowing for
heterogeneous agents (models) of sort.
All of these directions of research except for the last one firmly rest on the assumption
of a single, valid underlying model. But even in the case of heterogeneity this heterogeneity
is usually bounded which makes it essentially equivalent to the single model case with a
sufficiently large sample. The true challenge, however, remains to capture the situation in
which the number of genuine models grows largely proportionate to the number of agents
because only in this situation proper account is taken of the factually formative nature of
exchange rate modelling.
Maybe ironically, by their very, tireless hunt for puzzle resolutions, by jumping back
and forth from amending the theory to fixing rationality to allowing for heterogeneity
and many more, economists have long left behind the positivist approach to knowledge
generation they have once embarked on. A positivist approach would require to reject a
theory once it does not comply with the data quite like Newton’s law of gravity ultimately
had to be rejected. The incomprehensively large literature on the forward premium puzzle
would qualify for a rejection as well. Against all odds, however, economists hold onto it.
This reluctance to hypothesis rejection leads to the interesting situation that quite
12 The theory says that βs is exactly zero and ζs too.
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many versions of the forward premium puzzle / UIP co-exists. They are distinct from one
another by their degrees to which deviations from rational behaviour are allowed, what
data is used, and many variations of the core formulae and additional variables like in
Engel (2016, sec. C.), for example. When many theories and explanations of the same
facts are held valid then the according scientific approach is called constructivism as the
truth is the result of the scientist’s constructs rather than an objectively determinable fact.
In that sense, failing to reject UIP outright and piling up UIP variation after variation
exactly mirrors the formative nature of asset price generation.
2.3 Some implications for economic analyses
The key distinction between positivism and constructivism rests with the properties of
the assumed truth to be discovered. In the former case, it is unique, objective and hence
independent of the researcher’s judgement whereas in the other it depends on human
action because it is established by it.
If the positivist approach was more appropriate than the constructivist then the fol-
lowing must also be true. As there presumably exists only one, objective truth, the claim
of having found it should be corroborated with appropriate experiments.
For example, claims of feasible excess returns, like the forward premium puzzle, must
be proven by according actual evidence. This would entail the documentation of real,
excessively profitable investments. It is not sufficient to claim the existence of abnormal
profits without operating on them because it would lack the proof of these profits to exist
independently of ones’ own judgements. In other words, it must be ruled out that the
researcher’s action has formative character for the market under consideration.
There are also a number of approaches which are doubtful in the context of a potentially
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constructivist nature of the problem. For example, tests of rationality are meaningless
whenever the researcher is able to determine the objectively correct result of a set problem.
If test persons fail to discover the truth it will have no bearings on a real world that is
defined by multiple, potentially infinite such truths and even more so if the truth was
formative in nature.
If economists would openly embrace the possibility of a constructivist approach that
would push wide open the door to answering a myriad of research questions. For example,
what leads individuals to follow individual strategies instead of lining up for a common
blueprint? Why do rationality tests (sometimes) fail even in the presence of objective
truths? What are the consequences for macro models? Is the formative nature endogenous
or exogenous? Can the constructivist approach be reconciled with the concept of efficient
(financial) markets?
In other words, instead of spending another thirty-odd years on waging the same
wars on an empirically fragile no-arbitrage condition economists might instead take full
advantage of the opportunities the new approach affords them in order to shed a new,
bright light on understanding actual market dynamics.
3 Conclusions
The forward premium puzzle states that there are excess returns on financial markets
which would be at odds with the standard efficient market hypothesis. This comment
shows that the claim of having found statistical evidence for the forward premium puzzle
to prevail rests on very shaky grounds. In fact, the results of several recursive estimations
show that the findings by Engel (2016) to a large extent depend on the choice of the
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sample with several countries switching their roles as evidence in favour and against the
puzzle. This observation renders the claim of excessive returns rather coincidental than
systematic though the well-documented finding of implausible parameter values for the
most important point estimate remains.
As a consequence of the inconclusive attempt to establish the forward premium puzzle
this comment suggests to consider a change in the epistemological approach to the UIP
in particular and market dynamics at large. The proposed constructivist view promises a
great potential to significantly augment our understanding of actual market dynamics.
A Additional recursive analyses
In the absence of an objective stochastic process the constructivist approach to economics
seems appropriate. Econometric methods based on the positivist view are, by contrast,
bound to fail to produce reliable, robust evidence for whatever theory is put forth. There-
fore, the FAMA regressions presented in Engel’s (2016) were expected to deliver only
fragile, inconclusive evidence. Figure 1 above shows the results of standard robustness
checks by systematically varying the sample size in the FAMA regressions.
The following figure demonstrates that the lack of robustness must also be conceded
for the other key regressions (equations (7), (8) and (9)) reported in tables 3 through 5
respectively in Engel (2016). To that aim the sample start is varied between June 1979
and June 1984. Obviously, a conclusion drawn from a sample that covers 1979:6 through
2009:10 should be identical to the conclusion based on the sample 1984:6–2009:10 or any
sample in between. Minor deviations of the results should be allowed for in one out of ten
cases or so, depending on the actual level of significance.
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The below figure shows, that these deviations are way too frequent, to be acceptable
by any meaningful margin of error. The panels depict the lower bounds for the confidence
intervals of the key coefficient estimates based on the interval bootstrap procedures. The
confidence intervals cover 90 percent of the possible true parameter values according to
the respective estimations.13 All coefficients must to be positive with the exception of
equation (9) for supporting the claims of the paper. Graphically, this means that their
lower bounds are supposed to be above the zero line. In equation (9) the key coefficient
should be negative which is why the lower bounds are multiplied by minus one in order
to simplify the interpretation of the corresponding (bottom) panel.
Apparently, with the exception of equation (8) which corresponds to the results in
Engel’s (2016) table 4, all regression results are very much dependent on the specific
sample definition. To see that, consider first the left-most points in all panels. They
represent the results obtained in Engel’s article. Obviously, in the majority of cases
the lower bounds are above zero and hence support Engel’s line of arguments. As we
drop one observation after the other, the evidence deteriorates, however. Arguably, the
second panel from the top shows the worst results. This panel checks the robustness of
the FAMA regressions in real terms. With the full sample range (364 observations) the
forward premium puzzle in real terms finds support with the exception of Canada and Italy
(10 percent level of significance, interval bootstrap). Dropping 60 observations from the
beginning of the sample (leaving 304 observations) makes all confidence intervals include
the zero. Therefore, based on the sample 1984:6–2009:10 the forward premium puzzle in
real terms disappears entirely.
The “central empirical finding” (p.450) of Engel (2016) is scrutinised in the bottom
13 The technical details are provided in Engel (2016).
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The figure displays estimated lower bounds for the 90-percent confidence intervals for the
four key coefficients in Engel’s (2016) regressions (4), (7), (8), (9) (from top). The various
points correspond to different sample definitions. Any crossing of the zero line is evidence
for non-robustness of the coefficient estimates. The lower bound for the key coefficient in
(9) is multiplied by −1. Equations (7), (8), (9): bootstrapped percentile intervals.
Figure 2: Some more recursive analyses
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panel. Again, changing the sample definition topples the evidence. While the 1979 – 2009
sample support the main finding at large (all cases except France and UK), the sample
1984 – 2009 clearly contradicts it (with the exception of – again – UK and Germany). In
between, some countries’ lower bounds drop below zero and bounce back and vice versa
quite often. These multiple crossings of the zero line also safeguard against possible sample
size effects. Dropping some observations should, in principle, widen the confidence bands
but in the present situation that does not lead to a systematic loss of significance.
In summary, the empirical evidence presented in Engel (2016) must be considered very
fragile. Choosing the paper’s particular sample definition certainly permit the conclusions
drawn by the author. In the light of more recent samples the whole argument falls apart,
however.
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